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PREHISTORIC ACCOUNTING AND THE
PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION:
ON RECENT ARCHEOLOGICAL
EVIDENCE OF THE MIDDLE-EAST
FROM 8000 B.C. TO 3000 B.C.
Abstract: Recent archeological research offers revolutionary insight about the precursor of abstract counting and pictographic as
well as ideographic writing. This precursor was a data processing
system in which simple (and later complex) clay tokens of various
shapes were aggregated in hollow clay receptacles or envelopes (and
later sealed string systems) to represent symbolically assets and
economic transactions. Scores of such tokens (the recent explanation of which is due to Prof. Schmandt-Besserat) were found by
archeologists all over the Fertile Crescent in layers belonging to
the time between 8000 B.C. to 3100 B.C. — after this date
cuneiform clay tablets emerged.
The economic-philosophic implications of this discovery are
important. First, it suggests that accounting preceded abstract
counting as well as writing. Second, it suggests that conceptual
representation emerged gradually. Third, it confirms the previous
hypotheses that counting emerged in several stages. Fourth, it
reveals the existence of an abstract input-output principle some
10,000 years ago and a kind of double entry over 5,000 years ago.
Finally, it offers the earliest illustration of the (occasional) validity
of the correspondence theory.
To assist readers I have inserted at the beginning of the fifth
section some explanatory paragraphs on Wittgenstein's work.

Introduction
The quest for the origin of symbolic representation is not
unrelated to Wittgenstein's perennial question: How is lanThis paper was initially presented as "Wittgenstein and Archeological
Evidence of Representation and Data Processing from 8000 B.C. to 3000 B.C."
at the 12th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg/Wechsel, Austria) in August 1987. It is reproduced with permission of the General Editor of
the Wittgenstein Publication Series, Elisabeth Leinfellner, and the publishing
house, Hölder-Pichler-Tempskey, Vienna. Financial support by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for this project, and the
valuable correspondence with Professor Schmandt-Besserat are acknowledged.
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guage possible? Indeed a disclosure of the historical roots of
representation might lead to a novel and empirical answer to
Wittgenstein's major query — at least as far as written language is concerned.
During the last decade Professor Schmandt-Besserat, an
archeologist at the University of Texas in Austin [1978, 1980,
1981, 1981a, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1986a] has shed much light on
the origin of writing and counting. 1 I shall concisely recapitulate the history and results of her research 2 and offer interpretations of it from a philosophic as well as economic point of
view.
Symbolic Representation and the Evolution of Writing
The invention of writing has long been shrouded in awe
and mystery. Over the centuries many unsuccessful attempts
h a v e b e e n m a d e to e x p l a i n the o r i g i n of this event
[Schmandt-Besserat 1986, pp. 31-32] until in the early 19th
century archeological expeditions to Mesopotamia began to
clarify this problem by hard and fast evidence. A pictographic
limestone tablet unearthed at Kish, dating from about 3000
B.C.3 is usually regarded as the earliest piece of writing known.
But such isolated pictographs are very rare. In contrast to them
are the oldest collections of clay tablets found in great quantities in Uruk (the biblical Erek), dating from 3100 B.C. The
writing they contain is predominantly ideographic (abstract)
intermingled with only occasional pictographic signs (sketches
of objects such as a plow, chariot, sledge, boar, etc.) — but at
this stage the boundary between ideographic and pictographic
signs is blurred, and interpretations vary. This ideographic
nature of early cuneiform writing from the 4th millennium B.C.
was already recognized by Falkenstein [1936, p. 25], the first
person to investigate them. 4 The meaning of this early or
1

For details about the individual contributions of A. Leo Oppenheim,
Pierre Amiet, Denise Schmandt Besserat, and others to the clarification of the
origin of writing and the record keeping use of clay envelopes and string
aggregates, see: Schmandt-Besserat [1980, pp. 358-361] as well as Jasim and
Oates [1986, p. 348]. For a somewhat different interpretation see Vallat [1986,
pp. 334-337].
2
The recapitulation is mainly based on Schmandt-Besserat [1986].
3
Mallowan [1961, p. 67] as well as Hawkes [1963, p. 378] still state this date
with 3500 B.C.
4
Falkenstein [1964, p. 11] also emphasizes that the invention of cuneiform
writing is the invention of the Sumerians, and that it was created exclusively
for the recording of economic transactions.
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archaic writing is still an enigma, partly because of its ideographic nature, partly because most ideographs could not be
traced back to the later cuneiform writing of the first and
second millennium B.C. — only the ideographs for sheep, oil,
metal, labourer, measures of grain, animal and a few others
were traceable.
The abstract form of these symbols as well as the large
repertory of them (over a thousand different signs) combined
with the scarcity of preceding pictographs posed a vexing
question as to the evolution of writing. Surely it cannot have
happened overnight, it must have gradually evolved. Yet where
was the missing link, where was the prototype? It seems
plausible that writing started with a relatively small number of
pictographs, which gradually increased in number, slowly
changing into ideographs. Out of lack of any evidence, it was
hypothesized that the proto-writing must have been on perishable material and thus lost to posterity [Diringer 1968, p. 19].
However, Schmandt-Besserat advanced a much better substantiated and more plausible hypothesis. She noticed (from
1969 onwards) on occasion of visits to many archeological sites
and museums an unexpectedly large number of odd and
hitherto unexplained artifacts of various shapes to which she
refers as "tokens" and among which she distinguished two
major types: the earlier plain tokens (spheres, disks, cylinders,
triangles, rectangles, cones, ovoids, and tetrahedrons) from ca.
8000 B.C. onwards, and the later complex tokens (variously
incised or punctated and usually perforated, also of a greater
variety of forms — added shapes: e.g. vessel forms, parabolas
and bent coils). These small, ubiquitous objects (ca. 1 to 4 cm.
across) were carefully hand-molded of clay and hardened by
Exhibit 1

1. Plain clay tokens

burning at a relatively low temperature (of ca. 600° C). At some
sites only small numbers of these tokens were preserved, but at
other sites (e.g. at Jarmo, Iraq, dated 6500 B.C.) some 1500
Published by eGrove, 1987
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specimens were u n e a r t h e d . Whether in Israel, Syria, Iraq, Turkey or I r a n those artifacts were present all over the Middle
East in layers dating f r o m ca. 8000 to 3000 B.C. and even later.
This u b i q u i t y and w i d e dispersion obviously pointed at their
religious, cultural or economic importance; b u t w h a t was this
i m p o r t a n t function? All archeologists and experts working in
this area encountered these tokens, b u t none h a d a satisfactory
explanation for their f o r m e r use; a few experts thought they
were a m u l e t s or g a m e figures. But Schmandt-Besserat
[cf. 1986,
p . 34-35] noticed that the shape of many tokens matched with the
form of archaic signs on tablets. For e x a m p l e , a disk with a cross,

can be found a m o n g the tokens as well as a m o n g the signs on
clay tablets where it b e c a m e a circle w i t h cross enclosed. But
this ideograph is traceable to later writings and stands for
"sheep") similarly, an ovoid with circular incision stands for a
" j a r of oil", a triangle w i t h five incised lines m e a n s " m e t a l
(silver?)." The cone and the sphere stand for small and large
measures of grain respectively; a cylinder m a y be interpreted
as "one a n i m a l (sheep or goat?)" while a disk refers most likely
to a "flock of a n i m a l s probably half a score (i.e. ten)." But let
us listen to Schmandt-Besserat herself:
Exhibit 2

2. Complex clay tokens

" A b o u t 200 s p h e r i c a l clay e n v e l o p e s ( i n c l u d i n g
fragments) have been recovered in an area extending
f r o m Palestine to Iran, including Saudi Arabia. The
seals impressed upon their surface indicate their
formal character, and it seems clear t h a t the tokens
they contain stood for goods and stated liabilities.
The envelopes w o u l d h a v e r e m a i n e d of esoteric
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interest but for the discovery of their relationship to
the invention of writing. Indeed, their evolution illustrates no less than the transition between an archaic abacus and writing according to the following
sequence: (1) the invention of envelopes to hold tokens of specific transactions; (2) the impression of
markings on the surface of the envelopes to indicate
the shape and number of tokens included inside; (3)
the collapse of the envelopes into clay balls or tablets
bearing impressed signs; and (4) the elaboration of
the impressed signs into incised pictographs.
The study of the envelopes therefore provides new
insights into the origins of writing. It makes clear the
process of its emergence from an archaic recording
system based on tokens and throws light upon the
fortuitous nature of its invention. It demonstrates
that the cradle of writing was not confined to
Mesopotamia but extended to the west as far as the
upper Euphrates valley in Syria and to Elam at the
east. The date of the events can be pinpointed to the
Uruk IV period of 3200-3100 BC" [SchmandtBesserat, 1980, p. 385].
On the basis of this evidence few experts will doubt that
the precursor of writing was the representation of commodities
by means of clay symbols, not all of which were miniature
models but many were abstract shapes the meaning of which was
determined by convention. But what kind of messages did these
symbols convey?
Data Processing and Accounting in Prehistoric Times
The plain clay tokens are dating from ca. 8000 B.C. onwards and were discovered among village finds (and later
temple finds) unearthed in the Fertile Crescent of the Middle
East. 5 These tokens were sometimes enclosed in a "clay envelope" (hollow clay ball some 10 cm in diameter, the surface of
which bore markings — which in turn are among the first

5
The first plain tokens (around 8000 B.C.) were extracted from the remains
of "round hut compounds" on many archeological sites of the Fertile Crescent
— typical sites: Tell Mureybet and Tell Aswad in Syria, as well as Tepe Asiab
and Ganj Dareh Tepe in Iran. By the seventh millennium B.C. simple tokens
were also used in an area reaching from present Turkey to Israel.
The proportion of perforated tokens varies according to sites. At Uruk, only
46% are perforated but at other sites, such as Habuba Kabira in Syria, up to
80% of the tokens have a hole.
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evidence of writing — indicating the content for quick recognition, and seem to represent one of the earliest systematic
accounting systems. One or several specimen from Uruk, for
example, yielded the following tokens which SchmandtBesserat could match to the corresponding commodities as
shown below (adapted from Schmandt-Besserat 1983, p. 120):
Exhibit 3

3. Clay envelope (showing seal on surface) with five clay spheres.

3 incised ovoids
1 cylinder
9 tetrahedrons
3 trussed ducks 6
5 ovoids
4 parabolas
1 triangle
26 spheres

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

3 jars of oil
1 animal (sheep or goat)
9 units of services
3 trussed ducks
5?
4?
1 small measure of grain?
26 bariga of grain 7

6
"Trussed ducks" on the left hand side refers to small clay tokens resembling trussed ducks, while the same expression on the right hand side
refers to the slaughtered animals, similar to those in the supermarket.
7
A bariga is a (larger) unit of measure used in Sumer — perhaps equivalent
to the English "bushel."
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It is not difficult to recognize that each of these eight lines
represents a different commodity account identified by a
specific shape of concrete tokens — just as businessmen give
different names to different accounts, so the inhabitants of
ancient Mesopotamia assigned different shapes (or tokens of
different shapes) to different commodity accounts. Thus the
singularity of "token accounting" lies in the multiplicity of
shapes given to easily maleable clay tokens. Although these
simple and concrete tokens were first associated with village
life and agriculture, later on these "accounts" were kept (often
together and even mixed with collections of the more sophisticated abstract tokens) by priests and temple administrators, so
that the various shapes did not easily change their meaning —
the shapes were conventionalized and seem to have kept their
meaning for thousands of years. An envelope of tokens probably
functioned as a personal account about a steward or debtor
indicating the equity invested in such a person; but simultaneously it was an inventory list detailing this investment. Not
always did one token stand for a single piece of commodity,
sometimes it represented a specific measure of grain or a jar of
oil, etc. Yet those units were only loosely standardized and
should not be interpreted in any mathematical sense. But it is
crucial to note that before 3,200 B.C. there is still no evidence
that those concrete tokens represent numerals. At this stage,
counting in the abstract sense, as we know it today, had not yet
Exhibit 4

4. Clay envelope (showing traces of seal as well as Impressions of hardened
tokens) with tokens.
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emerged. 8 Thus it is correct to say thet accounting preceded
abstract counting.
Complex Tokens
Complex tokens are distinguished from plain tokens by a
greater variety of token shapes, by markings on those tokens
(incisions, punctations or appliqué coils, and pellets added to
the token surface), by a perforation of those tokens for the
purpose of stringing them and sealing them together (instead of
putting them into a clay envelope), and, above all, by their more
abstract usage.9 The term "abstract token" might be confusing
Exhibit 5

5. Sketched reconstruction of a string aggregate (showing clay seal on top and
five perforated ovoid tokens on string) — designed by Ellen Simmons.
8

The crucial step from token counting to a numerical system is best
described by Bertrand Russell [1919/60, p. 3] who points out that "it must have
taken ages to discover that a brace of pheasants and a couple of days were both
instances of the number two."
9
Whereas the plain or concrete tokens had plain unmarked surfaces and
came in a limited number of simple geometric shapes (flat and lenticular disks,
cones, tetrahedrons, cylinders and occasionally commodity and animal
shapes), the later complex or abstract tokens (closely tied to Sumerian temple
institutions) bore marks on their surface and came in a much greater number of
shapes (spheres, disks, cones, tetrahedrons, biconoids, ovoids, cylinders, bent
coils, triangles, parabolas, rectangles, rhomboids, container, animal and other
shapes). Each shape and marking had a well specified meaning. Typical objects
of reference of a token were: a measure of grain, a jar of oil, a fleece of wool, or
even a pot of beer. The cone and sphere were usually used for grain. They
correspond to the Sumerian ban and bariga which find their analogy in the
English peck and bushel.
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because those complex tokens are still concrete clay objects,
but now they are used in a way that approaches numerals in the
abstract sense. Thus the term "abstract" does not refer to the
token itself but to its use. But just as in the case of clay
envelopes, those sealed string collections are equivalent to
personal accounts about stewards and debtors, and simultaneously lists of inventories.
The Input-Output Principle: From Ancient Mesopotamia to the
20th Century
We have seen that by 3200 B.C. two kinds of accounting
techniques were employed, often simultaneously. The first consisted in keeping plain tokens of different shapes in a marked
and sealed clay envelope, the other in keeping an even greater
variety of complex (incised), perforated tokens on a sealed
string. There is sufficient evidence indicating that the plain
tokens referred to such assets as grain and cattle while the
complex tokens referred to services and manufactured goods.
This separation resembles the distinction between cash items
(including receivables, payables, etc.) and non-cash items (inventories, equipment, land, etc.) in double entry accounting of
the Italian Renaissance. And since grain and cattle were the
payment units or "cash items" of ancient Mesopotamia, the
parallel is all the more striking.
Each kind of token shape, whether plain or complex, can
be interpreted as a type of account, and the number of tokens
(in a clay envelope or on a string) of a particular shape represents the quantity of pertinent items. Then all tokens together
(of different shapes in a particular envelope or on a string)
represent an equity loosely aggregated by an envelope or string
(instead of the highly abstract aggregation attainable by
monetary values). This may seem primitive, yet it spared the
Sumerian scribe the valuation problem, which not only plagues
modern accountants but also removed accounting representation one further step from objective reality, creating subjectivity and adding ambiguity. Thus the "aggregate" or superaccount represented by a clay envelope or a collection of tokens
on a string, is not too much different from a balance sheet. It
certainly had a dual significance: in its details, it represented
the individual assets, in its totality it represented an equity.
But what was the entity behind this equity? Since these
"aggregates" were most frequently (but not exclusively) found
in former temple grounds (often a great number of such envelopes and string systems were stored in a single temple), the
Published by eGrove, 1987
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entity usually was a temple or, less frequently, an individual
person, family, or other small social group. There is archeological evidence that temples levied taxes possibly on the
basis of farming out temple assets to individual persons (debtors or stewards). Thus the entity was (at least by 3200 B.C.)
in most cases a temple institution, and the "debtor" probably
was a particular person. But to determine the entire equity of
such a temple government one would have had to further
aggregate all the envelopes and string aggregates within a
temple precinct — but there may not have been any need for
doing this since the main purpose of those accounting systems
was the monitoring of the obligations and levies from individual stewards and tax payers. Such a system also lends itself
to recording the actual payments in kind by the debtor —
archeologists have, indeed, repeatedly emphasized the debtnature of such a token aggregate and of many clay tablets of a
later age. It is possible even that the tokens or token aggregates
were handed over as receipts to the debtor or donor by the
temple administrator once the former's debt was "paid" or a
donation was made. But whatever the individual practices and
techniques may have been, there can be little doubt that those
ancient people moved clay tokens from one place to another in
strict correspondence with the transfer of commodities and
debt relations.
A Duality Principle
This means, first of all, that those ancient people of the
Middle East had record keeping systems, the basic logical structure of which was virtually identical with that of modem double
entry.10 One might reply that the transfer of ordinary goods, from
one person to another, already possessed this logical structure
which we call the input-output or duality principle. This is perfectly correct, but the ingenious stroke was to transfer this idea
or principle from actual commodities by a one-to-one correspondence to a conceptual system of representation. Once this crucial

10
For some thirty years I have tried to make clear to accountants that the
crucial event in accounting is not double entry — which, after all, is a mere
technique — but the logic structure behind it [Mattessich 1957/82, 1964, 1987]. A
set-theoretical analysis of this "flow" or "input-output" structure in terms of
ownership and debt relations is found in Appendix A of Mattessich [1964, pp.
448-465]. I have also demonstrated that this structure can manifest itself in
matrices, net works, vectors, algebraic equations, etc. Now we have evidence
that this logic structure was already present in record keeping systems some
10,000 years ago.
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fact of the input-output or duality principle has been established, the question whether the ancient Sumerians or any
other tribe used (more than five thousand years ago) a double
entry system, is of secondary importance.
However, a good case can be made that even double entry
(in the literal sense of the word) emerged as early as 3200 B.C.
From this time stem the earliest clay envelopes (bullae) that
bear on their surface the impressions of the tokens contained
inside. Putting those tokens into an envelope undoubtedly
meant the recording of quantities of various assets, or what we
today would call "making debit entries." But apart from this
were two further needs: (1) to reveal from outside the hidden
content of the envelope, and (2) to reveal at a glance the entire
equity represented by the envelope — as far as such an aggregation is possible without a common denominator. By sheer
coincidence both of these functions could be fulfilled by a
single act, namely by impressing the hardened tokens into the
surface of the softer clay envelope. If this interpretation is
correct, then those "mirror impressions" can be regarded as
genuine counter-entries (in this case, credit entries) on the
equity side of such an accounting system — since each token
inside the envelope represents an asset, and each impression
outside is part of the total equity.
Considering that this not only happened more than five
thousand years ago, before writing and abstract counting was
invented, the long tradition of accounting must either inspire
some awe or reinforce the view that accounting is a dusty
discipline indeed — one that literally arose out of the clay or
dust of the earth. But there are at least two further important
aspects to be discussed, both of which have philosophic implications.
The Correspondence Theory of Representation
The importance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for the philosophy
of science as well as for every individual science lies in his
enduring concern with questions of representation: How can
language represent reality? What makes it possible for a combination of words to represent a fact? How is it that a sentence
can say that such-and-such is the case?
In his first major work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,
Wittgenstein [1922] developed his "picture theory" which regards a sentence as a picture (i.e. a model of reality) in the
following sense: How is it possible that confronted for the first
time with a sentence (composed of familiar words), we underPublished by eGrove, 1987
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stand this sentence without any explanation? Although a sentence cannot say its meaning (it is only capable of saying that
so-and-so is the case), it can show its meaning. 11 And if it can
show this, then it must be some kind of picture of reality. Even
more critical is that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein asserts that
the relation between the elementary or atomic parts of a true
sentence must be in one-to-one correspondence with the objects
and constituents of a fact, i.e. with reality — and it is, above
all, this "logical atomism" together with its "correspondence
theory of truth" which he abandons in his later philosophy. 12
Because if
challenged to explain why we must suppose that
language is related to the world in that particular
way, he was — on his own confession — in no
position to give any literal reply . . . Propositions
were capable of modeling and, so, describing reality;
but they could not simultaneously describe how they
described it, without becoming selfreferential and
consequently meaningless" [Janik and Toulmin,
1973, pp. 189-190].
Thus the Tractatus has the merit of revealing the limitations
of prepositional language. It shows that logic as well as ethics
are transcendental. The Tractatus must not be misinterpreted
to be a positivistic work: "Positivism holds — and this is its
essence — that what we can speak about is all that matters in
life. Whereas Wittgenstein passionately believes that all that really
matters in human life is precisely what, in his view, we must be
silent about" [Engleman, 1967, p. 97].
Wittgenstein's second major work, The Philosophical Investigations (published posthumously in 1953) at least as influential as the Tractatus, constitutes a rejection of some of his
major previous thoughts, but it also is a continuation of his
11
"In a letter to Russell, Wittgenstein remarked that his "main contention"
was this distinction between what can be said in propositions — i.e. in
language — and what cannot be said but can only be shown. This he said, was
"the cardinal problem of philosophy" Malcolm [1967, p. 330].
12
With reference to the important problem of Wittgenstein's connecting of
elementary or atomic propositions with complex propositions, [Hintika, 1987, p.
30] offers the following crucial insight: "In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein used the
truth function theory to extend his picturing idea from atomic propositions to
all complex ones. In 1928-29 he gave up his belief that truth-function theory
could serve as such a bridge. Henceforth the same role had to be played by
suitable human activities ("calculi", later "language games"). The nature of
these activities was the main problem of his later philosophy."
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earlier philosophic quest. Here the notion of "language games"
and the importance of linguistic conventions supersede the
"picture theory." From now on the meaning of a sentence is not
derived from the picture property but from the use and application of the sentence. Wittgenstein's second philosophy is no
longer limited to the natural sciences and rejects the notion
that every form (structure) of a proposition can be anticipated
as a new combination of simple objects. 13 On the contrary, new
language games are possible and embody new "forms of living"
(Lebensformen). The meaning of a name is not the object it
pertains to; and naming is not prior to the meaning of a
sentence because before we know what a name stands for, we
must already have mastered the pertinent language game.
So, from now on, Wittgenstein focused his attention
instead on language as behaviour: concentrating his
expressions, on the language games within which
those rules are operative, and on the broad forms of
life which ultimately give those language games their
significance. The heart of the "transcendental" problem thus ceased (for Wittgenstein) to lie in the
formal character of linguistic representations; instead, it became an element in "the natural history
of man" [Janik and Toulmin, 1973, p. 223].
The accounting systems of the Sumerians and other ancient peoples are obviously not comprehensive or complete
language systems (in the ordinary sense), and thus cannot offer
any evidence for or against the validity of logical atomism and
the correspondence theory of truth. But they are something like
specialized and limited language systems or, more precisely,
representational systems for the purpose of giving account of an
entity's wealth and its flow. And as such they might provide
evidence for the usefulness of the correspondence theory of representation. Not only did every piece of commercial reality (a
measure of grain, a ewe or ram, a jar of oil or a weight of silver)

13
"The Tractatus held that the ultimate elements of language are names
that designate simple objects. In the Investigations it is argued that the words
"simple" and "complex" have no absolute meaning." In the Tractatus the
existence of simple objects was conceived as following from the requirement
that the sense of sentences is definite. In the Investigations this requirement is
regarded as another philosophical illusion. We have imagined an "ideal" of
languages that will not satisfy actual needs . . . Wittgenstein denied that we
always understand a sentence . . . sentences have sense only in special circumstances; in other circumstances we do not understand them . . . The view of
the Tractatus is entirely different [Malcolm, 1967, pp. 335-336].
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correspond, to a specific token, but also such relations, as transfer, property rights, and debt claims, were represented by
proper correspondences in this accounting system (through the
location of certain tokens in a particular aggregate). 14 It does
not matter that this system itself consisted of relatively concrete objects (like clay cylinders, cones, etc.) instead of more
abstract, written symbols; on the contrary this intermediary
step reveals to us the evolution of a conceptual system — it not
only demonstrates that abstraction is a matter of degree but also
how more abstract representational systems evolved from less
abstract ones. Above all, the archeological evidence shows that
the first systematic representational system was based on a
correspondence notion. The crucial thing is that input-output
relations apply not only to the actual transfer of commodities but
also to their representations. Because for the purpose of giving
account of those transfers of commodities, property claims, and
their results, clay tokens were removed from one place and put
into another.
This archeological evidence shows two things: (1) that the
precursor of written language was a system of representation
that exploited the one-to-one correspondence between segments of reality and certain more or less abstract symbols, and
(2) that such a one-to-one correspondence proved useful for
almost five thousand years as a major element of what was
probably the only systematic representational system available
to early agricultural communities as well as to the first phase
of urban culture. With this statement we do not negate the
objections raised against logical atomism, but we suggest that
in certain representations situations — particular in those with
a manageable range and clearly defined concepts — there is a
place for the correspondence theory.

14
One might argue that the much older paleolithic cave paintings and
miniature art constitute earlier evidence for a correspondence theory of representation. But in these caves only objects (e.g. animals and hunters) are
clearly represented while the relationships are, at best, merely implied. Certainly, the systematics necessary for a representational system, and the evidence afforded by the clay envelopes and string aggregates of the token
accounting systems, is nowhere found in paleolithic art. In other words,
paleotithic art represented mainly objects while neolithic record keeping
represented objects as well as facts in Wittgenstein's sense (i.e. relations
between objects). However, this hypothesis may founder if Margulis and
Sagan's [1986, p. 222] guess is correct that "hunter-gatherers were sketching
maps and plotting the movement of planets and stars as early as 40,000 years
ago."
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Janik and Toulmin [1973] claim that the historical root of
Wittgenstein's concern for language and "pictorial" representation lies less in Russell's influence than in Wittgenstein's
Viennese background:
Far from originating in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, as
we shall see, the idea of regarding language, symbolism and media of expression of all kinds as giving
us "representations" (Darstellungen) or "pictures"
fields of Viennese cultural debate. Among scientists
this notion had been in circulation at least since the
time of Hertz, who had characterized physical
theories as providing just such a Bild or Darstellung
of natural phenomena [footnote omitted]. At the
other extreme, it was equally familiar among artists
and musicians; Arnold Schönberg, for instance,
wrote an essay on musical thoughts, with the title
Der Musikalische Gedanke und die Logik, Technik, und
Kunst seiner Darstellung [footnote omitted]. By the
time Wittgenstein came to the scene, this debate had
been going on for some fifteen or twenty years in the
drawing rooms of Vienna. . ." [Janik and Toulmin,
1973, p.31].

(B

These authors also refer to the influence which the writings
of the renowned physicist Heinrich R. Hertz [1894] — who was
trying to present a "picture theory" as a system of mathematical models — had on Wittgenstein:
We form for ourselves images or symbols of external
objects; and the form which we give them is such
that the necessary consequence of the images in
thought are always the images of the necessary consequence in nature of the things pictured. In order
that this requirement may be satisfied, there must be
a certain conformity between n a t u r e and our
thought. Experience teaches us that the requirement
can be satisfied, and hence that such a conformity
does in fact exist. When from our accumulated previous experience we have once succeeded in deducing images of the desired nature, we can then in a
short time develop by means of them, as by means of
models, the consequences which in the external
world only arise in a comparatively long time, or as
the result of our own interposition. We are thus
enabled to be in advance of the facts, and to decide
as to present affairs in accordance with the insight so
obtained. The images which we here speak of are our
Published by eGrove, 1987
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conceptions of things. With the things themselves
they are in conformity in one important respect,
namely, in satisfying the above-mentioned requirement. For our purpose it is not necessary that they
should be in conformity with the things in any other
respect whatever [Hertz, 1899, pp. 1-2].
It seems that Hertz too had in mind a correspondence
theory, but limited to mathematics in relation to the essential
features of physics. Wittgenstein, on the other hand was ambitious enough in his Tractatus to expand this idea to language
in general as well as to all aspects of factual reality (i.e.
excluding value judgments). And this venture had to fail as the
emergence of Wittgenstein's [1953] second philosophy clearly
showed [Mattessich, 1978, pp. 95-97]. In other words the correspondence theory of representation may be defensible only
when applied to certain precisely defined languages in correspondence with a limited aspect of reality (physical phenomena,
certain economic and accounting phenomena, etc.).
Early Accounting Systems as Precursor of Counting, Writing and
Model Building
Counting seems to have emerged in three different stages
— counting by (1) one-to-one matching of unspecialized tokens
like pebbles, sticks, etc., (2) by specialized tokens (abstract
symbols as well as those with morphological similarities to the
objects represented), and (3) counting with genuine numerals,
abstracted from any token symbols [Schmandt-Besserat, 1983
and 1986a]. Only the last stage is counting in the proper or
modern, abstract sense; it seems to have emerged around 3200
B.C., simultaneously with writing. This is no coincidence because the evidence is strong that both activities arose from the
need to mark the surface of the clay envelopes in such a way
that the number and kinds of tokens contained in them could
easily be discerned. This was done by impressing each token
contained on the soft clay surface (the precursor of cuneiform
writing), but often not enough space may have been on the
surface, so a specific shape may have been combined with a
purely numerical sign (e.g. a number of dots, the first truly
abstract numerals).
But those early accounting systems reveal more, something
of special interest to philosophers pondering over Wittgenstein's ideas. Those token systems show that the one-to-one
correspondence between the tokens (including their position in
a specific envelope or on a string aggregate) and the pertinent
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol14/iss2/5
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economic facts, are not logic relations that can be syntactically
defined, 15 but are semantic relations to be "shown" by usage.
But this might hold only when dealing with "abstract token
shapes." Where tokens with morphological similarities to the
commodities are involved, one might be able to argue that the
link between the written language and reality is a geometric,
hence logical-mathematical relation.
In spite of the fact that this still leaves a "semantic gap"
between written and spoken language, it hints at the possibility
that there may be an evolutionary link between logic (in the
narrow sense of syntactics) and semantics — not only on the
theoretical but also on the practical level. This difference between syntactics and semantics might come close to the distinction between "stating" and "showing." And the connection
between the two asumes particular importance in our modern
world of video and computer technology. Because the latter has
acquired the ability to state or describe certain aspects of reality
by means of a logical sequence of magnetized dots (digital
representation) which in turn are further processed to show
this reality in form of sounds and more or less genuine pictures
(analogue representation).
To master their environment and to manipulate it for the
satisfaction of their own needs, biological organisms have
evolved a great variety of reaction mechanisms. In the higher
animals the most important one is the creation of ideas or
mental images. This is our window to the world, which, however, requires certain intermediaries. These are encoding/
decoding systems in the form of the internal neuronal language
system and various external language systems. Whether it is a
representation through neurons, or the prehistoric representation of reality through tokens, or modern video-computer imagery, in all cases the semantic gap between an abstract representation (e.g. a sequence of magnetic dots) and the more
concrete representation (a television picture) is bridged by
some kind of language code. Such a code may be purely
syntactical, but usually incorporates a system of conventions
("usages") which go beyond mere logical relations. But
whether the latter are too complex or ambiguous for scientific
purposes or whether it is for any other reason, the fact is that
modern semantics fashioned itself to a considerable extent on

15
In Wittgenstein's terminology: "said", "stated" or "described" in contrast
to "shown". But possibly my interpretation of those words somewhat differs
from that of Wittgenstein.
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the syntax of logic which, however, should not blur the difference between the two.
Two Views
Furthermore we have seen that both, the prehistoric recording systems as well as the modern video and computer
systems, demonstrate that the representational view (of the early
Wittgenstein) and the functional view (of the later Wittgenstein) are compatible and do not need to exclude each other.
Prehistoric accounting systems reveal the logical, indeed settheoretical, structure inherent in certain economic aspects of
reality. The clay envelopes and string aggregates possess the
structure of sets — or precisely sets of sets, because the superset of the entire aggregate can be understood as containing
subsets, each represented by a different token shape. Hence the
relations involved are those of "being a subset o f " ( c ) , "being
an element of" ( e ) a n d a "transaction" (an input-output vector).
And the notorious duality of accounting arises out of the dual
interpretation of a set as a collection of elements (the input) on
one side, and as a kind of totality (the output), on the other.
And a deeper analysis reveals that this duality, in turn, is
rooted in a physical input-output dichotomy manifesting a
conservation principle: the giving account of a certain input in
terms of its output in such economic transactions as the transfer of commodities from one "place" to another, be it for the
purpose of buying, lending, repaying, manufacturing, selling,
etc.
My Answer to Wittgenstein
Based on the preceding analysis, let me draw my conclusions:
First, how can we characterize the difference between
"saying" and "showing"? And is there a link between the two?
To simply state that sentences say, while pictures show, will
not do. Probing into the prehistory and early history of writing
has hopefully lifted some fog. Token accounting as well as
cuneiform writing, hieroglyphs, offer many examples of various
steps by which morphological tokens (i.e. those with similarity
to its referent) and pictographs (both of which seem "to show")
developed into abstract tokens and ideographs (both of which
seem "to say"). And now we may raise two questions: (1) At
what stage did a symbol lose its ability "to show"? And (2) at
what stage did it gain the ability "to say"?
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol14/iss2/5
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The first question is relatively easy to answer: As soon as
the structural similarity between a symbol and its referent gets
lost, it can no longer "show" — in this morphology and its loss
lies the difference between "showing" and "saying." And this
loss usually occurs at a fairly early stage in the development of
a sign.
Even more important, and perhaps more difficult to answer, is the second question. My personal reply is this: morphological tokens and pictographs do not only "show", they
also "say" (Marshall McLuhan may have said: "pictographs are
the message"); or more formally: from its earliest development
on such symbols are endowed with the power to say.16 Thus the
morphological tokens and pictographs not only describe structures, they themselves are similar structures. Yet in subsequent
steps of development — when these morphological similarities
have vanished — how can those now abstract tokens or signs
(in conjunction with some relations: e.g. placing a token into a
specific receptacle) continue to describe factual entities and
relations? The evolution of those tokens and linguistic signs
clearly shows that this "miracle" is made possible through the
previously established associations between each abstract sign
and the corresponding morphological token or pictograph
which in turn is structurally related to the pertinent empirical
object or fact. On a higher or later level this crucial association
is established by conventions — which might explain why the
later Wittgenstein put so much emphasis on linguistic conventions.
Our facit is that morphological tokens and pictographs are
a common denominator for "showing" and "saying" — those
symbols might be the missing link between those two activities.
And because there exists such a connection, it might be possible that aggregates of machines like a complete video system is
capable of transforming something that shows into something
that says, and vice versa.
And finally, my answer to Wittgenstein's perennial question
is that: the representation of reality by means of signs is
possible because language itself is a double-sided Janus-faced
creation — not unlike our mind/brain system. Language is

16
This seems to be in disagreement with Wittgenstein's [1922 item 4.1212]
"what can be shown, cannot be said" and I wonder whether this is due to a
difference in our notions of "showing" and "saying" or in some misunderstanding.
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capable of conveying ideas, yet it is deeply rooted in such physical
realities as vibrations of air, tokens and tablets of clay, ink on
papyrus or paper, magnetized dots on plastic tapes, etc. Both,
language and the mind/brain system, belong to the realm of
concepts and forms as well as to the realm of matter and energy.
Everyday languages as well as scientific and technical languages are possible for the same reason that makes our genetic,
our neuronal and our hormonal language systems possible. Our
social languages are certainly not our own original inventions,
they are merely copies or re-inventions of nature's work; and it
seems that all "natural" as well as "social" languages are a
manifestation of nature's basic duality of conceptualization and
legislation, on one side, and execution and material manifestation on the other.
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